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November 30, 1994
Marilyn M. Branch, Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Pendergrass v. Utah Bd. of Pardons ££ al. . Case No. 940560-CA

Dear Ms. Branch:
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, respondents hereby submit this letter advising the Court
of pertinent and significant authority that has come to their
attention regarding the applicability of Rule 65B(e) to review of
actions by the Board of Pardons in the above-captioned case.
On pages 4 and 7 of respondents' principal brief, respondents
explicitly relied on the Court's decision in Preece v. House. 848
P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1993), for the proposition that claims of
procedural due process violations by the Board of Pardons are
cognizable under subsection (e) of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B, rather than
under subsection (b) or subsection (c). Respondents acknowledged
in a footnote (see Brief of Appellees at 7, n.l) that a review of
Preece was pending before the Supreme Court of Utah, with the
applicable subsection of Rule 65B at issue.
On November 23, 1994, the supreme court entered its opinion in
Preece (see Preece v. House. No. 920605 (Utah November 23, 1994),
attached). Because the supreme court found that this Court lacked
appellate jurisdiction in the case, it vacated this Court's Preece
opinion.
However, as this Court had done, the supreme court
considered Preece's claims under Rule 65B(e) (see slip opinion at
5).
A copy of the supreme court's opinion is enclosed for the
Court's use.
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UTAH SUPREME COURT

Sincerely,

BRIEF

^OStoO

Nancy L. Kemp
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAIL.IN
^ |lerej:)y certify that on Lliib iULli dajy of November, 1994, a
true and accurate copy of the foregoing Rule 24 (j) letter was
iiiiITpn postage prepaid, to t tie Following:
John Fletcher Pendergxass
Central Utah Correctional Facility
P. 0. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634

/
--4?

i

"\

u_

\ .

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH A*.
*

——00O00—~

Robert D. Preece,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

No. 920605
F I L E D
November 23, 1994

v.
Tom House, Warden of the Utah
State Prison; Pete Haun,
Chairman of the Utah Board
of Pardons; Heather Cooke,
Member of the Utah Board of
Pardons, and other individual
members of the Utah Board of
Pardons both past and present
whose identities are presently
unknown,
Defendants and Respondents.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., James H. Beadles, Asst,
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants
J. Thomas Boven, Salt Lake City, for Utah State
Prison Inmates

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
HOWE, Justice:
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the
court of appeals in Preece v. House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App,
1993), cert, granted. 853 P.2d 89 (Utah 1993).
In July 1982, Robert D. Preece pleaded guilty to two
counts of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and was
sentenced to two five-to-life terms of imprisonment.
Approximately one year after his incarceration, he stabbed and
killed an inmate to whom he owed money. He pleaded guilty to
manslaughter and was sentenced to an additional term of one to
fifteen years to run concurrently with his other sentences.

Eight years later, Preece attended a parole grant
hearing conducted by Heather Cooke, a member of the Utah Board of
Pardons. She informed him that under the Utah Sentence and
Release Guidelines, Utah Court Rules Ann. app. D (1994), he
should be incarcerated for "147 months, which would mean no
release until October 1994." However, she indicated that she
planned to "go below [the] guideline" and recommend to the board
that he be released on May 11, 1993. Four days later, the full
board rejected Cooke's recommendation and ordered that Preece not
be paroled until October 11, 1994, the parole date which the
board thought was consistent with the guidelines.
In May 1992, Preece filed this petition for
extraordinary relief in third district court under rule 65B of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It listed as defendants Tom
House, Warden of the Utah State Prison, Pete Haun, Chairman of
the Utah Board of Pardons, Heather Cooke, and other "[individual
members of the Utah State Board of Pardons both past and present
whose identities are presently unknown." He alleged that
(1) Cooke was not impartial, (2) the board had considered a
disciplinary report that was supposed to have been expunged from
his prison file, (3) the board violated his procedural and
substantive due process rights by not allowing him to "know what
information was being submitted or relied upon" during his parole
hearings, (4) the Utah sentencing guidelines create an
"expectation of release" or liberty interest entitled to due
process protection, and (5) due process requires the board to
give an explanation for its decision to depart from the
sentencing guidelines.
Sometime during the summer of 1992, Assistant Attorney
General Steven Morrisett discovered that the board of pardons'
staff had in fact miscalculated the length of Preece's
incarceration under the guidelines at 147 months (12 1/2 years).
The correct time period was 111 months (9 1/2 years). Morrisett
disclosed this error to the district court and indicated that the
board was likely to grant Preece a rehearing. On the basis of
this information, the court continued the case to "let the Board
of Pardons decide what they want to do in terms of taking their
own action first."
In September 1992, Preece appeared before Don
Blanchard, a member of the board of pardons, for a special
attention hearing. Blanchard took the case under advisement for
approximately 2 weeks, after which the full board rendered its
decision to retain the October 1994 parole date. Preece amended
his complaint, arguing that his original allegations against the
board applied to the special attention hearing.
The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus
and ordered that Preece be "released from the Utah State Prison
forthwith." The court stated:
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[U]nder the circumstance of the error made as
to the guidelines discussed with Petitioner
• . • the Petitioner is entitled to an
explanation of the error which the Board
refuses to do. Further# due process requires
fair process and a Petitioner is entitled to
an explanation of why the error should be
ignored and the longer term served. It is
cruel and unusual punishment to do otherwise.
The Petitioner has been denied due process
and is being treated to cruel and unusual
punishment when no correction or explanation
is given as to the mistake and as to the time
to be served by the Petitioner.
The court of appeals granted defendants' ex parte motion for stay
pending appeal.
After hearing argument, the court of appeals rendered a
per curiam decision. Preece v. House. 848 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). It reversed the district court's order of release,
holding that "the authority to determine parole dates is vested
in the Board of Pardons11 and that habeas review of parole
decisions is "limited to a review of procedural due process and
does not extend authority for judicial review of the
%
reasonableness of the parole decision.'" Id. at 164. The court
further held that the board had violated its own rules by not
providing a written explanation for its decision to retain the
October 1994 date. Utah Admin. R. 671-305-2 (1992). However, it
ruled that the "appropriate remedy" for this violation was "to
require the Board expeditiously to provide the district court and
petitioner with a written explanation of its reasons for the
parole decision." Preece, 848 P.2d at 164. Finally, the court
remanded the case, ordering the district court to treat it under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(e). Id.
We granted Preece's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Preece v. House, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). A few days later,
defendants filed a motion to vacate the opinion of the court of
appeals and to consider the case as an original direct appeal
from the district court transferred here pursuant to rule 44 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. After hearing argument,
we denied the motion but directed that the question of
jurisdiction be briefed and argued in this appeal.
We first address the jurisdictional issue. Prior to
April 1992, appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writ sought by persons who were incarcerated or serving any other
criminal sentence were governed by Utah Code Ann.
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§ 78-2a-3(2) (g) .* That subsection provided that such appeals
should be taken to the court of appeals except when the petition
challenged the conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony, in which case the appeal would be heard by
this court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j). Accordingly, we
held in Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons. 820 P.2d 473, 473 (Utah
1991), that a petitioner who had been convicted of a first degree
felony and who alleged that the board of pardons had violated his
rights to due process but who did not challenge his conviction or
sentence must appeal the denial of his petition to the court of
appeals rather than to this court*
However, in April 1992, section 78-2a-3 was amended by
the addition of subsection 2(h) to specifically deal with appeals
from orders on petitions for extraordinary writ challenging
decisions of the board of pardons* That subsection provides:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:

(h) appeals from the orders on
petitions for extraordinary writs
challenging the decisions of the Board
of Pardons, except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony.
Thus, under subsection 2(h) such appeals shall be heard by the
court of appeals ••except in cases involving a first degree or
capital felony,* in which case, again, the appeal would be heard
by this court pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j).
We believe that subsection 2(h) must be interpreted in
light of subsection 2(g) and that it is the intent of 2(h) that
the court of appeals hear appeals from orders on petitions for
extraordinary writ challenging decisions of the board of pardons
That subsection provides:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
•

*

•

9

(g) appeals from orders on
petitions for extraordinary writs sought
by persons who are incarcerated or
serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the
sentence for a first degree or capital
felony.
No. 920605
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except when the petition additionally challenges the conviction
of. or sentence for a first degree felony or a capital felony* in
that instance, the appeal is to be heard by this court.
In the instant case, Preece, in his petition,
challenged a decision of the board of pardons made at his
original parole grant hearing that fixed the length of his prison
stay. We held in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d
902, 911-12 (Utah 1993), that the determination made by the board
of pardons at an original parole grant hearing as to the time to
be served by a prison inmate is inherently a sentencing function,
gee algQ Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991)
(board of pardons performs function analogous to that of trial
judge in jurisdictions .that have determinate sentencing scheme)
Thus, Preece, on this appeal, is challenging a decision of the
board of pardons and his sentence for two first degree felonies.
Accordingly, his appeal lies with this court, not with the court
of appeals. We therefore vacate the opinion of the court of
appeals and consider this case as an original direct appeal from
the district court transferred here from the court of appeals
pursuant to rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Having determined the grounds upon which this court has
jurisdiction, .we now turn to the merits of the petition. The
district court ordered Preece ••released from the Utah State
Prison forthwith" on the ground that the board refused to correct
or explain its decision to retain a release date which had been
miscalculated under the Utah sentencing guidelines. Preece
contends that the sentencing guidelines create a liberty interest
or an "expectation of release" subject to protection under the
state due process clause. Utah Const, art. I, § 7. He argues
that the board must "give specific and detailed reasoning"
justifying a decision to impose a release date that is
inconsistent with the guidelines.
The state sentencing guidelines used by the board of
pardons do not have the force and effect of law. Labrum. 870
P.2d at 908. Consequently, any "expectation of release" derived
from the guidelines is at best tenuous. However, we need not
decide whether the state due process clause requires the board to
explain decisions which do not conform to the guidelines. The
board's own rules require that an "explanation of the reasons for
[a] decision [be] given and supported in writing." Utah Admin.
R. 71-305-2 (1992). When the board failed to comply with this
rule, Preece appropriately sought extraordinary relief. Utah R.
Civ. P. 65B(e)(2)(B) (person can petition court for extraordinary
relief "where an inferior court, administrative agency,
corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by
law as a duty of office, trust or station").
However, the district court exceeded its authority when
it ordered Preece "released . . . forthwith." In our
indeterminate sentencing scheme, the board of pardons acts as a
5
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sentencing entity# having exclusive authority to ••determine [ ] the
actual number of years a defendant is to serve." Labruro, 870
P.2d at 907 (citing Foote. 808 P.2d at 735). Moreover, not every
circumstance that gives rise to extraordinary relief compels the
immediate release of a petitioner from every aspect of physical
imprisonment. See Wickham v. Fisherr 629 P.2d 896# 900 (Utah
1981) (holding that remedy for unlawful condition of confinement
is "%elimination of. that specific condition of physical
imprisonment,'" not "%release from every aspect of physical
imprisonment'" (quoting Cravatt v. Thomas. 399 F. Supp. 956, 96263 (W.D. Wis. 1975))); accord Termunde v. Cooke, 786 P.2d 1341f
1342 (Utah 1990).
Thus, the appropriate remedy in this case was to order
the board to comply with its rules by giving Preece a written
explanation for its decision to retain the October 1994 parole
date. However, this relief "%can no longer affect the rights of
the litigants'" because the board gave Preece a written
explanation for its decision during the pendency of this appeal.
State v. Davis. 721 P.2d 894# 895 (Utah 1986) (quoting Spain v.
Stewart. 639 P.2d 166f 168 (Utah 1981)). Therefore, this aspect
of the petition is moot.
Preece also argues that the board of pardons
arbitrarily and capriciously chose to exceed his guideline term
by 36 months. He contends that article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution requires judicial review of this decision. We
disagree. Utah Code Ann. S 77-27-5(3) (Supp. 1994) provides,
"Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles,
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution,
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not
subject to judicial review." This statute does not preclude
judicial review of such decisions by way of extraordinary writ.
Foote. 808 P.2d at 735. However, our review is limited to the
"process by which~th"e Board undertakes its sentencing function."
Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994).
"[W]e do not sit as a panel of review on the result, absent some
other constitutional claim." Id. Furthermore, so long as the
period of incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons
falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, e.g.,
five years to life, then that decision, absent unusual
circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, as explained above, Preece contends that the
board violated his procedural and substantive due process rights
by not allowing him to "know what information was being submitted
or relied upon" during his parole hearings. In LabrumP 870 P.2d
at 909, we determined that state due process "requires that the
inmate know what information the Board will be considering at the
[original parole grant] hearing and that the inmate know soon
enough in advance to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare
responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies." See Utah Const, art. I,
S 7. We further held that this rule applied "to any inmate who
No. 920605
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currently ha[d] A sclaim pending in the district court or on
appeal before th* court or the court of appeals challenging
original parolefifranthearing procedures on due process grounds.n
Labrum. 870 P. 2d at 914 • In oral argument, defendants conceded
that the board violated Preece's due process rights as defined in
Labrum and that £is petition for extraordinary relief on this
ground was pending at the time Labrum was decided. Therefore,
Preece is entitled to a new hearinq before the board.
The unconditional order of release entered by the
district court i£ reversed. The case is remanded to the district
court for disposition consistent this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

Michael D. Zimmerman, Chief
Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Associate
Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Leonard H. Russon, Justice
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